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Abstract 
 
This paper has its origins in a 2013 proposal by the author, that the concept 
of ‘spiritual care’ in clinical settings might fruitfully be grounded in the findings 
of the Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR). In a recent paper, John Paley 
rejects the central arguments and asserts his conviction that a model for 
‘spiritual care’ cannot be derived from the insights of evolutionary psychology. 
In the present paper the author employs a modified form of Fichtean dialectic 
to examine the contrasting positions and, via a process of analysis and 
synthesis, identify the key areas for further exploration and research. He 
concludes, first, that CSR in itself does not provide a sufficient theoretical 
justification for the notion and practice of ‘spiritual care’; secondly, that any 
attempt to develop a general theory of spiritual care would need to pay closer 
attention to the role of historically-situated religious communities; and finally, 
that these objections nevertheless do not amount to an argument against the 
attempt to provide spiritual care as part of person-centred care.  Instead, a 
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revised model is proposed which has the potential to provide testable 
predictions in this field. 
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Cognitive Science of Religion 
 
Introduction 
 
‘Spiritual Care’ has been part of the agenda for nursing and allied health 
professions for some 40 years, and proponents of the concept argue for its 
importance as an element in holistic, person-centred care. But it is dependent 
(in a secular health system in a religiously diverse society) on a conception of 
human ‘spirituality’ which in principle can be detached from the historic 
associations of the term with concrete, collective, organized religions and 
identified as a universal (or at least widespread) human characteristic.  
 
However, attempts to identify and theoretically explicate such a concept of 
spirituality have proved problematic. Even proponents of the concept of 
spiritual care have complained of a concept of spirituality that is a 
‘marshmallow . . . thin, uncritical, dull and un-nutritious’ (Pattison 2001) ; and 
some prominent advocates of the role of religion in healthcare have dismissed 
the notion as vacuous, arguing that ‘spirituality’ is either a form of religion, or 
an incoherent agglomeration of unrelated beliefs and practices  (Koenig et al. 
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2012; Zinnbauer et al. 1997). Even some proponents of the ideals of spiritual 
care would argue that it is, at bottom, just good nursing care (Clarke 2013). 
 
Perhaps for this reason, the idea and practice of spiritual care has gained only 
uneven acceptance. It is well established in Palliative Care (which has 
religious roots) (Department of Health 2010) but has less purchase in Primary 
and Acute Care (Mowat et al. 2012; Kevern & Hill 2015; Cockell & McSherry 
2012). There is also a significant dissonance between the official position of 
healthcare providers and professional bodies, which remain broadly 
favourable to the idea of spiritual care, and its teaching and delivery 
(Lewinson et al. 2015; McSherry & Ross 2015; Balboni et al. 2014; Rushton 
2014; Nascimento et al. 2016). 
 
As I will argue below, this gap between widespread approval for the notion of 
spiritual care and its delivery in practice is indicative of a certain theoretical 
and conceptual impoverishment. The current paper represents part of an 
ongoing project to explore whether a more unified and theoretically-informed 
model of secular spiritual care may be generated by reference to theoretical 
and empirical findings in evolutionary studies in the fields of cognitive 
psychology, sociology and social anthropology. If so, it may provide a basis 
for testable predictions and experimentation concerning what makes ‘good’ 
spiritual care, and how it may be deployed to improve the patient experience 
and patient outcomes 
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Background 
 
Care for the spiritual needs of patients is now enshrined as a key value in a 
range of policy documents (see e.g. Cockell & McSherry 2012; World Health 
Organization 1998). This progress is remarkable, given that there is no single 
definition of ‘spirituality’ which has gained widespread acceptance, or any 
coherent body of theory underpinning the concept. Instead, there has been a 
plethora of ad hoc definitions for the purposes of study or benchmarking (e.g. 
Puchalski et al. 2014) a number of analyses of what the term means to 
patients or professionals (e.g. McSherry & Jamieson 2011), and a number of 
systematic reviews of the way the concept is developed in the existing 
literature. (e.g. Reinert & Koenig 2013) Thus, for example, Weathers et al. 
(2015) undertake a concept analysis of spirituality in the literature and 
identify three themes: connectedness, transcendence, meaning in life. In 
effect, they are substituting one indefinable term with three (see also e.g. 
Gall et al. 2011; Tanyi 2002). The result is, at best, a ‘semantic field’  (Grandy 
1992) on which there is a broad convergence, with little theoretical 
background or clear boundaries.  
 
This uneasy state of affairs was attacked in a paper by John Paley (Paley 
2008a) in this journal, with a challenge which represents a sort of ‘emperor’s 
new clothes’ moment for proponents of spiritual care.  In it, he argued that 
the notion of patient spirituality lacked any clear content or definition; and 
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that its apparent significance for patient care rested on assumptions and 
commitments borrowed from theology and religious practice which had no 
place in a secular healthcare system. In a memorable phrase, he claimed that 
“lack of scholarship has turned the topic into a metaphysical backwater” (p.1) 
 
Paley’s paper provoked a flurry of immediate responses and discussion (see 
e.g. Nolan 2009;Pesut 2008; Paley 2010) which falls outside the scope of this 
paper and is now of mostly historical interest. In the longer term, there are 
two main critically constructive lines of thought that have emerged from 
Paley’s paper. The first largely accepts Paley’s analysis of the vagueness of 
‘spirituality’, but rejects his conclusion that this thereby renders the term 
redundant. Instead, so the argument goes, health care needs ‘thin, vague 
and useful’ concepts in order to prevent reductionist tendencies towards a 
single narrow understanding of health and illness (Swinton & Pattison 2010); 
to maintain a place for language to do with meaning and purpose (Nolan 
2009; Nolan 2011); and to direct professionals’ attention to aspects of care 
that may otherwise be marginalized (Swinton 2011; Swinton 2014). Such 
concepts, so the argument goes, are integral to the ecology of health care: 
compare, for example the ideas of Dignity, Compassion, or Diversity. 
 
The second response is the one that I tried to develop in my 2013 paper 
(Kevern 2013a). In it, I sought to address the obvious theoretical deficiency 
that had condemned the study of spirituality to a “metaphysical backwater”. I 
argued that the concept may be capable of clearer and more consistent 
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theoretical grounding by drawing on key findings from evolutionary 
psychology and the cognitive science of religion. In these fields, researchers 
were finding empirical results which helped to cast light on why religious or 
spiritual beliefs were so widespread and persistent, to do with the way the 
human brain had evolved to manage threats and support communal living. I 
argued that these provided a persuasive (if incomplete) explanation for why 
‘spirituality’ was widespread; what features could reasonably be expected to 
crop up repeatedly; how they might impinge upon the patient experience; 
and how studies might be constructed to test and evaluate appropriate 
spiritual care by way of response. (Kevern 2013a).  
 
The overall thesis was that, although an individual’s spiritual and religious 
dispositions were clearly deeply influenced by their culture and context, there 
was a demonstrably universal element to spiritual intuitions which derived 
from the evolved structure of human cognition: there were ‘spiritual 
universals’ which could be accounted for as outcomes of the human 
evolutionary story. Consequently, there were, potentially, universal features 
of spiritual care which could be applied irrespective of the particular religious, 
or nonreligious, attitudes of the patient.  
 
John Paley recently did me the honour of constructing a critical response in 
the pages of this journal (Paley 2015), for which I am triply grateful. In the 
first place, it reassured me that there is a case to answer here, and so a 
question worthy of further exploration. In the second, his critique helped to 
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clarify the questions, refine the issues and core concepts, and point to where 
further work needs to be done in order to evaluate and develop this 
approach. Finally, therefore, by his response he has moved the exploration 
on: he has stimulated a wider and deeper conversation about the potential 
and limitations of attaching the term ‘spirituality’ to a particular set of 
intuitions and emotions which arise in the brain as a result of its evolutionary 
history.  
 
The current paper thus represents the fourth stage in an ongoing discussion 
which, I hope, will eventually lay the groundwork for a theory of patient 
spirituality and spiritual care.  
 
 
 
Method 
 
Paley’s paper took the form of a refutation (as demonstrated by its title) and 
it would be straightforward to continue the conversation in an adversarial 
mode. To do so, however, would be to distort the fact that in many of the key 
disputes, Paley and I are in effect on the same side: we both reject the 
current construction of ‘spirituality’ as inadequately defined and, perhaps, 
inappropriately ‘religious’; we would both like to see health care in which an 
intervention is judged on its own merits, where scientific theories are 
generated and deployed to refine existing practice, and where these are then 
Evolutionary Psychology and Spiritual Care 
 8 
evaluated by the examination of an evidence base. The main difference is 
whether we believe talk of ‘spirituality’ can be brought into this cycle of 
practice-theory-evidence–evaluation or is a dubious and unmanageable 
interloper.  
 
I therefore propose a more collaborative and reflective approach, based upon 
the Fichtean dialectic of thesis-antithesis-synthesis (Fichte 1982). In other 
words, I shall seek to bring the two papers into a critical conversation with a 
view to identifying, beyond the thesis-antithesis dialectic, a new synthesis 
which exceeds the positions of either paper.  
 
This approach indicates that my response to Paley’s critique will require four 
stages: 
 
1. Thesis and antithesis. Summary of my argument and Paley’s response 
2. Dialectical analysis. A critical discussion of arguments and counter-
arguments for our divergent positions with a view to distinguishing 
those issues on which no agreement is possible; and those in which 
the antithesis casts light on and extends the thesis 
3. Synthesis. Discussion and speculative development of those issues in 
which further reflection or research can cast light on the central 
problems 
4.  Conclusion. Summary of findings to date and restatement of central 
issues.  
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1. Thesis and antithesis 
 
For the sake of brevity, the summary of key points from my original proposal 
and Paley’s response will only be sketched in here, and will inevitably 
therefore overlook some of the finer points on both sides of the argument. 
The purpose of this section is not to rehearse each move in the respective 
arguments, but to provide a clear enough sense of their structure and overall 
direction to enable a more detailed identification and analysis of the key 
issues in the sections that follow.  
 
 
Thesis 
 
The paper (Kevern 2013a) does not attempt to be an objective argument for 
or against the practice of spiritual care in a healthcare setting, but is 
addressed to readers who believe that “the notion of ‘spirituality’ points 
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(however vaguely) to something fundamental in human beings and therefore 
in person-centred care” (p.9). I contend that there is little prospect of 
‘spiritual care’ gaining any traction in healthcare contexts unless and until it 
can be provided with some conceptual clarity and a theoretical basis for 
engaging in it. Thus, to establish the role of spiritual care in a secular and 
materialist context, it is necessary to have an account of “why it is important, 
what its main features are and how it may function in a healthcare context.” 
(p.9) 
 
The emerging ‘standard model’ deriving from the Cognitive Sciences of 
Religion offers a possible theoretical framework for this project. It suggests 
that, as a predisposition to religious beliefs (or, as I would now prefer to call 
them, ‘spiritual intuitions’): ‘spirituality’ “may have a place in the very 
architecture of the human brain, long before ‘religion’ shapes and conditions 
it.” (p.10) 
 
In the paper itself, I stress that this model is inadequate as a general account 
of human beings’ spirituality, religiosity and spiritual needs. In practice, 
religious and spiritual beliefs are historically acquired, socially mediated and 
reinforced. There is therefore generally no straightforward transition from a 
description of typical spiritual intuitions through spiritual needs to a 
prescription for the satisfaction of them in ‘spiritual care’.  However, patients 
in a hospice or hospital context share some particular circumstances which 
may increase the salience of this model of spiritual intuitions. In general, they 
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are separated from their usual sources of religious dogma and are 
reappraising their religious beliefs in the light of stressful, existentially-
challenging circumstances. This may mean that their ‘early-emerging and 
cognitive biases’ (Bloom 2009 p.124) have particular salience and power. 
 
If this is the case, there may well be identifiable, widespread themes which 
can be expected to recur among patients in acute care regardless of whether 
such patients are explicitly religious or not. These may provide the basis for 
an empirical and reductionist account of the importance and focus of spiritual 
care that may appropriately be applied in a secular context. “Specifically, 
there are three key areas  . . . – around the ascription of agency in events, 
purpose to objects and occurrences, and the way in which ‘belief’ is achieved 
and validated – which may repay careful attention in ensuring the best 
outcomes for patients” (p.15). An early attempt at applying these insights to 
the evidence base on ‘religious coping’ forms the substance of a companion 
paper, which however falls outside the scope of the current debate (Kevern 
2012a).  
 
 
Antithesis 
 
Paley’s response weaves together a number of divergent themes which resist 
a single clear account. But it revolves mainly around a dichotomy between 
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properties ‘selected-for’ by evolution, and what he terms ‘evolutionary 
accidents’: 
 
According to most CSR researchers, religion is a by-product of 
evolution (Murray & Goldberg 2005). This means that, although the 
dedicated cognitive mechanisms referred to above were selected for 
directly, religious beliefs and practices were not. Rather, they are an 
incidental consequence of those dedicated mechanisms. In other 
words, religious belief is an ‘evolutionary accident’ (Bloom 2009 p.118). 
There are numerous examples of this kind of evolutionary contingency. 
A classic example from human anatomy  is the ‘belly button’ (Buss et 
al. 1998). The navel is not an adaptation; it has no survival function in 
itself. Rather, it is a by-product of the umbilical cord, which is a 
genuine adaptation . . . 
 
. . . Since reference to supernatural agents is a natural extension of the 
relevant cognitive systems, the acquisition of these systems made 
human beings susceptible to religious discourse. If religion corresponds 
to the belly button, these cognitive mechanisms correspond to the 
umbilical cord. (Paley 2015 p.214) 
 
Paley’s central contention is that I have confused evolutionary contingencies 
with selected-for consequences, and so been led into four logical non-
sequiturs and an ‘undefended assumption’: 
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1. The fundamental-in-person-centred-care non-sequitur. My use of the 
term ‘fundamental’ will be considered in more detail in the next section 
and need not be rehearsed here. The main issue for Paley is that he 
understands me to mean that ‘religion’ (undefined) is therefore hard-
wired and inevitable. He concludes, “Kevern’s non-sequitur, and his 
argument more generally, trades on an ambiguity in the idea that 
religion is, in CSR terms, ‘fundamental’ or ‘natural’ . . . he is fudging 
the distinction between a selected-for characteristic, and a non-
selected-for-consequence-of-a-selected-for-characteristic” (p.217). 
2. The balanced-mental-state non-sequitur. Even if religion were ‘natural’, 
“It does not follow that, according to CSR, religion is necessary, basic, 
beneficial, healthy, mentally healthy, indispensable, an essence, a good 
thing, or the core of human existence.” 
3. The coming-to-religious-belief-alone non-sequitur.  This seems to rest 
for Paley on the assumption that my statement that CSR gives priority 
to the individual implies ontological or temporal priority: “Kevern seems 
to think that, if this is true, them (according to CSR) religious beliefs 
must first be acquired by individuals, and then must afterwards be 
‘reinforced’ by religious insititutions” (p.218).  
4. The isolated-individual-switch-on non-sequitur. In Paley’s own words, 
“This misunderstanding [about the priority of the individual] pervades 
almost all of what Kevern has to say. Most significantly, he is under the 
impression that CSR mechanisms apply only, or primarily, to individuals 
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. . . Kevern seems to believe that the CSR modules ‘switch on’ for 
people who are isolated, and somehow ‘switch off, or cede cognitive 
salience to some other cognitive system, when the individual is 
restored to the religious collective.” (p.219) 
5. The spirituality-as-individual assumption. “Kevern appears to assume 
that spirituality is by definition an individual matter, intrinsically 
‘internal’ whereas religion is collective and ‘external’. (p.219) 
 
Paley concludes his paper with an extended section on ‘The spirituality 
agenda’ which I intend to set aside as incidental to the current study. It is a 
re-presentation of an argument which he has made fairly consistently (Paley 
2008a; Paley 2008c; Paley 2009; Paley 2008b; Paley 2010) and which does 
not relate directly to the topic in hand. Instead, it is a counter-narrative of the 
type that the anthropologist Evans-Pritchard notoriously characterized as a 
‘Just-so’ story (Evans-Pritchard & Evans-Pritchard 1965): it offers a causal 
account by linking together some facts and observations, but its 
persuasiveness lies in its internal coherence and capacity to flesh out existing 
convictions rather than its testable or verifiable statements. 
 
 
2. Dialectical Analysis 
 
Clearing the ground: points of agreement and clarifications 
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Any academic confrontation is liable to create a certain amount of confusion 
and ‘background noise’, as the protagonists probe and challenge apparent 
weak spots in each others’ arguments. Given the analytical character of this 
paper, it is necessary to spend some time defining the contested ground more 
precisely and so trace out carefully the steps that lead towards the 
‘Synthesis'.  These technicalities will not be of equal relevance or interest to 
every reader, and those who are not particularly interested in the archaeology 
of the debate may prefer to skip this section for now and move straight to the 
substantive discussions in the following one.  
 
At the outset, there are three substantial areas of agreement which are in 
danger of being masked by the adversarial style of academic debate: 
 
 The basic problem of spirituality in health care. Paley’s critique of the 
use of ‘spirituality’ in relation to patient care in his earlier papers rests 
on a number of arguments:  the absence of any empirical evidence for 
the existence of a ‘spirit’ (Paley 2008a; Paley 2008c; Paley 2009),  a 
distortion due to the jurisdictional claims of the profession itself (Paley 
2008b) and the influence of an unacknowledged “strand of Christian 
theology” (Paley 2008a, p9).  
 
For the purposes of argument, the position of this paper is that Paley is 
correct in this analysis and in his conclusion that “Methodological 
agnosticism implies that health professionals should evaluate patients’ 
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beliefs in utilitarian terms – as they would lifestyle choices – allowing 
for the possibility, to be studied empirically, that spiritual beliefs 
sometimes bring health benefits to those who hold them.” (Paley 2010, 
p.183). Where we disagree is only in his assumption that these points 
mean that talk of spirituality in patient care should be rigorously 
excluded. On the contrary, they appear to point to the need to 
evaluate interventions in spiritual care rigorously in terms of their 
outcomes, rather than by any hypothesized origins in christian theology 
or the manoeuvrings of ambitious professionals.  
 
 
 Cognitive models of religion and their elements. The very basic model 
which I provided in my original paper is considerably expanded in 
Paley’s account, but the essential structure remains the same, along 
with the claim that there is now a substantial view among cognitive 
scientists that some of their experimental results cast light on some of 
the reasons that individuals hold religious beliefs. In sum, we converge 
around a definition which he quotes from McCauley (2011):  
 
My case has not been that humans are naturally religious, but 
rather that their maturationally natural cognitive systems 
develop in ways that make people thoroughly receptive to 
religions... (p.22) 
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Where Paley and I diverge is on the significance and implications of 
these findings, which will be subject to more detailed analysis later. 
 
 The practical distinction between ‘spirituality’ and ‘religion’. Paley 
objects to the rough distinction I make (derived from Heelas et al. 
2005) between spirituality as ‘inner’ and religion as ‘outer’. For practical 
purposes, I am content to substitute a distinction which he himself 
identifies in the literature, between religion as ‘institutional’ and 
spirituality as ‘universal’ (Paley 2008b): the important point is that 
spirituality (as universal) is presumably individually-held and perhaps 
innate, whereas religion has a necessarily public and/or organizational 
aspect.  
 
 
In addition, there are a few areas in which a confusion has arisen from my 
use of terms, and Paley’s interpretation of them: 
 
 
1. On spirituality as ‘fundamental’.  In my earlier paper (Kevern 2013a, 
p.13) I make the working assumption that “spirituality points to 
something fundamental in human beings and therefore in person-
centred care”. Paley points to some difficulties with this statement and, 
on reflection, it clearly needs more formulation and clarification. I 
intended to make no universal anthropological claim, but only a 
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contingent and practical one: that a full account of person-centred care 
should include some consideration of those aspects which are typically 
classified under the term ‘spiritual’, on the grounds that people do 
report spiritual or religious distress and it is appropriate to respond to it 
as such.  
 
2. A ‘balanced mental state’. Another stage in my argument at which it 
suffered from a lack of terminological precision was in the claim that “A 
practical implication of this finding . . . is that a balanced mental state 
is more likely to include some transaction with divine beings than not” 
(Kevern 2013a, p.12). Paley, not unreasonably, interprets this as 
implying normativity: that a ‘balanced’ person is one who ‘transacts’ 
with divine beings. My intention here was descriptive rather than 
normative, that person-centred care may therefore entail working with 
and supporting whatever version of this ‘transaction’ is (for whatever 
reason) favoured by the individual concerned.  
 
3.  On the ’priority’ of the cognitive. In a rather puzzling passage, Paley 
contends that, “Kevern thinks CSR implies . . . that people do come to 
religious beliefs ‘all alone’” (Paley 2015), an inference that seems to 
derive form his misunderstanding of the concept of ‘priority’. When I 
stated that CSR gives ‘priority’ to the individual, this was meant in an 
epistemological rather than historical sense: in his words, “These 
cognitive mechanisms are the conditions-of-possibility for religious 
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belief as such; local culture fills in the detail of specific creeds and 
narratives” (p.213), and it is self-evident that specialists in cognitive 
science will focus their attention on individuals and their cognition 
(Paley 2015, p.218).  
 
4. Distinguishing spirituality and religion. Given this ‘priority’, and in the 
light of the practical distinction made above between ‘spirituality’ and 
‘religion’, it is clear that when cognitive scientists refer to ‘religion’, 
they are talking of the cognitive and therefore individual and 
potentially universal dimension of religion: in other words, something 
very similar to what we have just agreed to define as ‘spirituality’. 
Similarly, the literature on religious coping on which I draw in my 
paper employs the terminology in the specific, narrow realm of 
individual psychology, and so we are justified in treating that as 
‘spirituality’ within the definition deployed here. Consequently, when 
Paley objects that “CSR is an account of religion, and CSR theorists 
rarely talk about spirituality . . . So Kevern needs to persuade us that 
CSR has something to say about ‘spirituality’” (p.218). he is tripping up 
on a confusion between two discourses.   
 
As a partial response to this confusion, I will for the purposes of the 
present paper distinguish between ‘spiritual intuitions’, as individually-
held (and possibly unreflective) and the collectively-held, normative 
status of ‘religious beliefs’. Similarly, I will distinguish between 
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individual ‘spiritual practices’ and collective institutionally-sanctioned 
‘religious practices’ . These are, of course, merely heuristic distinctions, 
and in reality individuals ‘individualise’ their religious practices as 
religions ‘collectivise’ individual ones. The purpose of the distinctions 
here is simply to bring precision to the discussion at points of potential 
confusion.  
 
Points of substantive disagreement: the dialectic 
 
Setting aside the points of  agreement and clarifications above, there are two 
broad areas of contention which remain between Paley’s position and my own 
original one. These are the ‘framing’ account that he gives of religion as a 
‘spandrel’, along with the inference that it is therefore irrelevant to the 
provision of health care; and the “four non-sequiturs and one unfounded 
assumption” which he claims undermine my argument.  
 
The ‘framing’ distinction upon which Paley bases his analysis is between 
selected-for characteristics (such as agency detection) and what he at one 
point terms a “a non-selected-for-consequence-of-a-selected-for-
characteristic” (p.218). In this he invokes a common trope in evolutionary 
arguments, that of the ‘spandrel’, an image from architecture. A spandrel is 
an architectural side-product, the necessary infill between two arches that are 
separated only by columns, which may be decorated and so become an 
aesthetic feature in its own right but remains a geometrical accident of 
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purposeful activity. By analogy, so the argument goes, not everything that 
evolution throws up is ‘meant’ to be there: some features are just side-
products of evolutionary histories which have had another, evolutionarily 
useful, outcome (e.g. Atran 2004). To illustrate this point, Paley invokes the 
image of the navel, “a by-product of the umbilical cord, which is a genuine 
adaptation” (p.218). Similarly, religion is a by-product of our cognitive 
architecture, which is the genuine adaptation. Not only organized religion, but 
the spiritual intuitions which represent its internalized counterpart can, he 
infers, be discounted as both trivial and irrelevant to healthcare. 
 
To summarise the analysis so far, it appears that Paley’s critique rests upon 
two assumptions which appear to be unwarranted: that spiritual intuitions can 
only be understood as such a “non-selected-for-consequence-of-a-selected-
for-characteristic” as the navel; and that a “non-selected-for-consequence-of-
a-selected-for-characteristic” cannot be recognised as a valid need in health 
care. We will return to these points in the section to follow. 
 
 Turning to what Paley claims are my ‘four non-sequiturs and an unwarranted 
assumption”, it becomes apparent that three of the ‘non-sequiturs’ can be set 
aside without further ado. The fundamental-in-person-centred-care non-
sequitur; the balanced-mental-state non-sequitur and the coming-to-religious-
belief-alone non-sequitur rest respectively on a precise interpretation of the 
terms ‘fundamental’, ‘balanced’ and ‘priority’ which they were never intended 
to bear.  
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However, the final two items, The isolated-individual-switch-on non-sequitur; 
and the spirituality-as-individual assumption deserve a more careful 
treatment. Although Paley’s charge rests partly on the claims for ‘priority’ 
mentioned above, there is a deeper matter at issue here. The burden of my 
original argument (p.10) was that CSR would have limited value as a way of 
explicating religious dogma and behaviour in the everyday world, because it 
deals only with individual spiritual intuitions and cannot be descriptive of 
socially- and historically- conditioned religious expression. However, it might 
have potential in the special circumstances of (say) an acute hospital ward in 
which the social context of religious expression is attenuated and the 
combined effects of isolation and change-induced stress may predispose 
towards the sort of minimally-counterintuitive, quick-and-dirty thinking that 
characterizes spiritual intuitions. What Paley has demonstrated here is the 
need for a more subtle and comprehensive account of the relationship 
between religious dogma, religious practice and spiritual intuitions that is less 
dependent upon the postulation of an extreme ‘ideal-type’ patient, because 
there will never be an actual patient who is so isolated (both socially and 
temporally) from the religious beliefs and practices within which their spiritual 
intuitions and individual practices are framed.  
 
In the light of this analysis, it appears that there are three issues worthy of 
further exploration and development. It will not be possible to evaluate the 
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claim that CSR could provide ‘spiritual care’ with a theoretical basis for 
definition and predictions until the following have been addressed:    
 
1. If the tendency of human beings to have deep-seated spiritual 
intuitions is to be understood as a ‘spandrel’, an accidental by-product 
of the fundamental architecture of human cognition, does it therefore 
follow that it is not subject to adaptation and change through the 
operation of natural selection at the level of individuals-in-community? 
2. If these spiritual intuitions are to be understood as a ‘spandrel’, does it 
therefore follow that they are to be treated as unworthy of attention in 
the delivery of person-centred health care? 
3. If it is not possible to conceive of real patients as ‘ideal-type’ subjects 
whose spiritual intuitions and needs derive from their cognitive 
architecture independently of their socially- and historically- 
conditioned religious beliefs and practices, how must the model be 
developed to take account of possible selective pressures and adaptive 
behaviour at the level of community? 
 
These considerations will form the basis for the ‘Synthesis’ section which 
follows 
 
 
 
3. Synthesis 
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It is worth noting that Paley’s own argument for his central assumption is 
surprisingly weak: “according to most CSR researchers, religion is a by-
product of evolution (Murray and Goldberg 2009)” (p.214). An appeal to ‘most 
researchers’ is already a weak one, but on analysis is further undermined by 
two considerations. First, it is not at all surprising that researchers who 
specialize in the cognitive architecture of individual minds will be particularly 
appreciative of the evolutionary pressures on those cognitive architectures 
themselves, at the individual level: it is no criticism of a scientist to say that 
they will see first what is in their field of view. Secondly, one does not need to 
widen that field of view very far to find a long tradition of advocates of a 
contrary opinion to the effect that religion is adaptive, in social anthropology 
and psychology of religion, but also among cognitive scientists themselves 
(Baumard & Chevallier 2015; Johnson 2012; Morewedge & Clear 2008; 
Norenzayan et al. 2012; Norenzayan 2013; Norenzayan et al. 2014; Peoples & 
Marlowe 2012; Pyysiäinen & Hauser 2010; Sosis 2009). Indeed, for some 
reason Paley neglects to add that Murray and Goldberg themselves identify 
two distinct schools of thought, although they consider the ‘adaptationists’ to 
be in the minority among evolutionary theorists of religion at the time they 
are writing (Murray & Goldberg 2005 p.183). In the context of this broader 
and deeper debate on the relationship between evolutionary psychology and 
religions as socially and historically encountered the simple binary between 
‘selected-for’ traits and useless ‘spandrels’ quickly proves inadequate on 
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several levels, and a more subtle conceptual structure needs to be developed 
to take account of three additional considerations. 
 
First, the concept of purpose and intention embedded in the notion of a 
‘selected-for’ characteristic needs to be deconstructed, because the concept 
of purposive activity or intention has been smuggled in to the discourse: a 
building is built, by builders. To borrow some terminology from Pittendrigh (in 
Lorenz 1966, p.274), it is acceptable to use purposive language in 
evolutionary discourse, but only when it is clear such language is being used 
teleonomically, not teleologically: to speak of the ‘purpose’ of a feature is to 
describe what it achieves in the contemporary context, not what it was 
‘originally for’. In this case, to state that a characteristic such as the 
Hyperactive Agency detection Device (HADD) (Barrett 2011) was originally 
‘selected for’ because it improved possessors’ chances of evading predators 
does not entail the conclusion that it has no other possible value or costs for 
the individuals or communities in which it forms part of the phenotype. 
Applying this line of reasoning to the case under discussion, we may say that 
the speculative distinction between a  “selected-for-characteristic” and a 
“non-selected-for-consequence-of-a-selected-for-characteristic” has no 
explanatory value when considering whether spiritual intuitions merit the 
provision of spiritual care.  
 
Secondly, it does not follow that because a feature was ‘originally’ for one 
purpose, it cannot be used for other purposes that have adaptive significance 
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(Powell & Clarke 2012). The fine distinction here is between the terminology 
of an ‘adaptation’ (which, it is assumed, developed as a response to specific 
selection pressures) and a characteristic which is ‘adaptive’ (in the sense that, 
even in the absence of the original selection pressures, possession of the 
characteristic positively of negatively affects the fitness of the individuals or 
communities). The technical term for the process is ‘exaptation’ (Gould 1991) 
or secondary adaptation: for example, feathers are thought to have originally 
evolved for insulation, but are ‘exapted’ both for flight, and separately for 
display (for example, in a peacock’s tail). Applying this line of reasoning to the 
case under discussion, we may say that even if spiritual intuitions are a by-
product of a prior evolutionary process, it does not follow that they have no 
adaptive value (whether positive or negative) in contemporary social 
situations; or that therefore they are not worthy of attention as part of 
person-centred care. 
 
Thirdly, and following directly from the above, it should be clear that there is 
no warrant for the assumption that section pressures operate in a single 
direction, at a single level, in order to produce an adaptation. On the 
contrary, the explanatory power of the concept of natural selection rests 
largely on its flexibility and applicability at the level of individual proteins, 
cells, organs, individuals and communities: the basic logical operations can be 
brought to bear in each case. In relation to the case under discussion, we 
may plausibly conclude that, as well as spiritual intuitions having adaptive 
significance, the religious-organisational expressions and vehicles for these 
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intuitions in concrete historical and social communities are liable to selection 
pressures, which themselves may vary over time (Baumard & Chevallier 
2015). In other words, some religious expressions are liable to survive better 
than others, by a process both of community selection and cultural selection.  
 
It should be noted that, although the operation of selective pressures on 
religious communities is a logical conclusion (by tautology), it does not follow 
that the process of selection has any substantive effect upon the structure 
and expression of actual religious communities in time and space. This 
remains the most contentious and difficult to demonstrate element of an 
adaptationist account of religion; and the account being developed here does 
not depend upon such a conclusion. For more detailed analysis of this option 
the reader is referred to Sosis (2009); and Powell & Clarke (2012) 
 
 
Returning to the three questions which were raised at the end of the previous 
section:  
 
1. Spandrels and exaptations 
 
 
Applying this line of argument to the present case, it should be clear that it is 
not necessary to claim that a propensity to spiritual intuitions is ‘originally’ 
selected-for in order to claim that such a propensity has adaptive significance 
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in the present day in order for it to be subject to selection pressures; and to 
claim that such pressures are likely to have been operative over a 
considerable period of time (as evidenced by the emergence of developed, 
persistent social expressions in organized religions) in order to warrant the 
assumption it has been shaped by these pressures into different secondary 
adaptations or ‘exaptations’ (Sosis 2009).  
 
In sum, the binary between what Paley rather clumsily terms  ‘a selected-for’ 
and ‘a non-selected-for-consequence-of-a-selected-for-characteristic’ is an 
ideologically-driven construction which does not reflect a defensible distinction 
in evolutionary theory itself.  It is quite plausible that the existence of spiritual 
intuitions is a by-product of a prior selective process; but it does not follow 
that, therefore, no selection pressure at all has ever been applied to the 
existence, strength , character or expression of spiritual intuitions, whether at 
the individual or collective level (as (Powell & Clarke (2012) say, “This is a 
considerable evidentiary burden to shoulder”!). However, for the same 
reasons it is not possible to advance the argument that people in acute care 
are somehow driven back on their own ‘spiritual intuitions’ stripped of all 
context: by definition, these spiritual intuitions have been formed, refined and 
articulated within particular sociocultural communal religious contexts.  
 
2. On navels and spiritual care 
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The second point at which Paley’s argument for the irrelevance of spiritual 
intuitions seems to fall down is in his inference that, if such intuitions are not 
directly selected-for, spiritual care can have no role as part of person-centred 
health care. This seems to be a straightforward non-sequitur. There is ample 
evidence that a patient’s  spiritual or religious beliefs and practices can have a 
significant effect upon their wellbeing and even survival chances (e.g. 
Zinnbauer et al. 1997; Pargament et al. 2010; Koenig et al. 2012) and it 
follows that there is a prima facie case for paying attention to these coping 
strategies as part of overall care. The argument about whether spiritual 
intuitions are selected-for or “a non-selected-for-consequence-of-a-selected-
for-characteristic” surely has no direct effect on whether we judge ‘spiritual 
care’ to be a useful practice in overall person-centred care or not.  
 
To return to the analogy of the navel which Paley introduces, it is obvious 
that ‘originally’ this was a by-product of the umbilicus. But it is not impossible 
to imagine that, for example, poorly-formed navels may be susceptible to 
infections or hernia; that a particular form of navel be judged by the patient 
as ‘ugly’ or shameful; or that peculiar features of the appearance of the navel 
may have diagnostic significance. The absence of a discernible teleology for 
the navel does not constitute a prima facie case for excluding it from all 
medical consideration. 
 
Paley’s counter-claim is that I would not treat the human capacity to ascribe 
agency to moving shapes on a screen (Heider & Simmel 1944) as similarly 
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‘fundamental’ for person-centred care, but the same logic applies: if a person 
were reporting, say, anxiety because they were interpreting the movement of 
one of the shapes as ‘bullying’ or ‘upset’, then some intervention would be 
appropriate. Similarly, if the activity of bassoon playing or playing video 
games can be shown to assist a patient’s recovery, the question of whether it 
is selected-for or selected-as, or neither, is simply irrelevant.  
 
This reinforces the claim that person-centred care needs to be 
‘nonfoundationalist’, in the sense that it does not attempt to conform to a 
template of what good health and therefore good care should look like, but 
adapts to the needs and preferences of each individual for what they consider 
to be the best outcome in the light of the clinical evidence available. A version 
of spiritual care that refuses to consider evidence-based interventions to do 
with religion (or for that matter bassoon-playing) on the grounds that they 
cannot possibly be referring to a real object in the world would, clearly, be 
ideologically-driven rather than outcomes-focussed.  
 
 
3. On religious organizations and spiritual intuitions 
 
The argument that I have been developing to this point is that, (even) if the 
origin and continuing existence of spiritual intuitions is not ‘selected-for’, the 
form and expression of these intuitions in real time is almost certainly subject 
to selection pressures. This means that it is legitimate to understand them as 
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having an intimate relationship with our experience of the world and our place 
in it; that their function and role in relation to patient wellbeing is therefore a 
subject worthy of study; and that evidence gathered from this study can 
appropriately be used to guide spiritual care, as part of the general remit of 
patient-centred care.  
 
However, in this more refined version of my original argument, it becomes 
apparent that there is a serious shortcoming. If the form and expression of 
spiritual intuitions is subject to adaptive pressures, these are being applied 
within the social and historical world of human communities rather than at the 
level of individual human brains. To put it another way, and using a 
categorical distinction applied earlier: there is no empirical distinction to be 
drawn between ‘individual’ spirituality and ‘organisational’ religion, since the 
selective pressures that are brought to bear on the former are mediated 
through the latter. Thus, any distinction has a purely formal and 
epistemological status. David Sloan Wilson would take the argument further: 
once it is allowed that selection is operative on multiple levels from the 
individual neuron to the community of persons, “If the individual is no longer 
a privileged unit of selection, it is no longer a privileged unit of cognition. We 
are free to imagine individuals in a social group connected in a circuitry that 
gives the group the status of the brain and the individual the status of the 
neuron.” (Wilson 2010 p.33) 
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If religion as a whole is to be taken as subject to selection pressures that 
complement or impact upon cognitively-based spiritual intuitions rather than 
simply expressing them, then my earlier heuristic move of treating isolated 
patients in acute hospital care as an ideal-type ‘special case’ appears 
unsustainable. The selection pressures on the group, its dogmas and practices 
cannot be ‘bracketed out’ of consideration even temporarily in the service of a 
‘special case’. Any attempt to model the broad features of spiritual care in 
terms of spiritual intuitions must take into account and include the religio-
cultural context in which such selection takes place.  
 
Consequently, modifying the model I originally proposed in the light of further 
consideration of the population-level processes of selection, it is possible to 
make the following tentative predictions regarding the key elements of a 
model of spiritual care that is informed by the evidence and by the 
perspective of evolutionary psychology generally: 
 
1. There will be some forms of ‘religious coping’ which can be explained 
in terms of CSR and selective pressures giving rise to individual 
spiritual intuitions (Kevern 2012a). These can provide some 
explanation of recurring elements in spiritual care such as the search 
for agency.  
2. However, within-population selection predicts for variation in the 
strength, salience and character of these cognitively-driven intuitions 
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(Johnson 2012). Consequently, blanket-level injunctions and protocols 
for particular spiritual care interventions will never be reliable. 
3. Furthermore, population-level selection will be influenced by the need 
to adapt to cultural, environmental and technological conditions 
(Norenzayan 2013) which entails the need to take account of particular 
religious and social backgrounds when offering spiritual care to 
individuals: the socioreligious context cannot be ‘bracketed out’ of 
spiritual care.  
4. Nevertheless, inter-population selection promotes ‘prosocial’ values and 
practices (such as mutuality and reinforcing rites) which favour the 
survival of the group as a whole, even potentially at cost to the 
personal survival of the individual (Baumard & Chevallier 2015; 
Morewedge & Clear 2008; Norenzayan et al. 2012). Consequently, 
there are some shared values held by most if not all persistent religious 
organisations which reinforce the belonging and security of the 
individual and therefore need to be taken into account in person-
centred care generally.  
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusions 
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The title of the paper which began this exchange of views posed a question, 
“Can Cognitive Science rescue ‘spiritual care’ from a metaphysical 
backwater?”. The answer appears to be that it cannot, or at least not 
comprehensively and consistently. Paley and I clearly agree on this point, 
although for instructively divergent reasons.  
 
From his paper, I infer that Paley’s main reason for rejecting the proposal is 
that he has a more persuasive counter-narrative in which he understands the 
use of the term spirituality in health care as ‘ideologically driven’ (p.9). This is 
apparent from the inclusion of his counter-narrative as part of his response to 
my paper, a strategy which, paradoxically, seems ‘ideologically driven’ in its 
own right. His secondary argument is that my proposal was based upon “four 
logical non-sequiturs and an ‘undefended assumption’” and had therefore 
proved itself hollow. In the analysis above I have responded to these five 
points and used them as the basis for a more sophisticated reflection.  
 
My own reasons for responding to the question (“Can the cognitive science of 
religion from a metaphysical backwater?”) in the negative are rather different, 
and boil down to three points. First, there is a material point: it has become 
apparent in the course of the discussion that the field of view of CSR is in 
itself too narrow to encompass the range of selection pressures and 
consequent physical, psychological and cultural artefacts which converge to 
contribute to an individual’s spiritual or religious world. Secondly, there is an 
associated methodological one: that patients in acute hospital wards cannot 
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be treated as inhabiting a religiously-isolated world, driven back on ‘quick and 
dirty’ religious thinking, even for the purposes of a thought experiment. 
Finally, a discursive point: that ‘spiritual care’ does not need to be rescued 
from a metaphysical backwater because it does not need to have a 
metaphysics. The philosophy of patient-centred care is, by conviction as well 
as by accident, resistant to being captured by a single metaphysical 
description of the human condition: it does not seek to prescribe or describe 
in advance the basic elements and norms of human existence or human 
preference, but seeks to enable the individual patient to identify their own 
needs, then to meet them.  
 
Nevertheless, in the course of the discussion it has been possible to sketch 
out what a model of spiritual care informed by evolutionary psychology in a 
broader framework might look like, and what it implies for the provision of 
spiritual care. In short, it predicts that there will be some elements of 
individual spiritual coping (and so of spiritual care) which can be explained by 
a consideration of CSR at the individual level; and that there will be other 
elements (such as the broadly shared values of mutuality and 
trustworthiness) which will be reinforced by religious organization and 
belonging at the communal level and explicable by evolutionary anthropology. 
It therefore makes possible testable predictions about how ‘spiritual care’ 
might most effectively be offered, the detailed development of which must 
await a later paper. 
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Practically, the model also points to three conclusions in relation to the 
provision of spiritual care. First, a general point: given the supposed common 
origins of spiritual need in the evolution of individual cognition on the one 
hand and the fundamental selection pressures governing groups on the other, 
there is some theoretical justification for seeking common themes in ‘spiritual 
care’ which enhance patient wellbeing and coping. Secondly, however, given 
the predicted variation between individuals, the character of spiritual care 
must be understood as dialogic rather than didactic, therapeutic rather than 
interventionist. Finally, the relation of organized religious networks and their 
officials to this process is complex. On the one hand, they are likely to be the 
source of religious practices which support the patient’s wellbeing and coping; 
on the other, since the primary selection pressures operative on them concern 
the survival of the group rather than the individual, they may be a source of 
tensions within the individual or between the individual and their social group. 
Consequently, it does not necessarily follow that spiritual care is best given by 
a representative of the patient’s religious group (Kevern 2012b) 
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